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ABSTRACT
Executive  information  systems  (EIS)  are  the  most-recent  computer-based  information
systems to have emerged with the intention of providing executives with the information they
require to run their businesses. Some advocates of these systems see them as a panaceathe
long-awaited moment when computing will provide meaningful and significant assistance to
top management. However, others have questioned the extent to which these systems are
suited to executive work, and see them as yet another passing fad in a field that has had more
than its share of the same. This paper discusses some of the potential benefits to executives
that have been identified in the literature as arising from the use of EIS. The results of a field
study  which  investigated  the  extent  to  which  EIS  are  actually  used  by  executives  are
reported. The findings corroborate the now widespread finding that executives are not the
main users of EIS. Some reasons for this are identified and possible remedies are suggested.
1. The Emergence of EIS and the Potential Benefits of EIS for Executives
While  there  are  many  differing  definitions  of  EIS,  there  is  broad  agreement  on  the
characteristics  of  EIS.  They are  easy to  use,  invariably making  use  of  a  graphical  user
interface; they can capture both external and internal information of relevance to executives
(Watson, Rainer and Koh, 1991); they can also cater for soft, non-quantitative information,
and can provide highly-aggregated information, while still allowing selective 'drill-down' to
the underlying detail if required. Trends can be monitored and represented graphically, and
various office support functions such as electronic mail, diary and calendaring facilities are
often provided (Rockart and De Long, 1988).
The concept of providing information to executive management is not something newonly
its  computerisation  is  new.  Given  that  top  management  have  up  to  now  succeeded  in
acquiring the information they need to run their business without direct access to computer-
based information systems, the question arises as to why EIS are achieving prominence. The
literature suggests a number of broad factors as relevant: firstly, there is a ‘pull’ factor in that
executives are suggested to be more computer-literate and willing to become direct users of
computer systems (cf. Houdeshel and Watson, 1987; Paller and Laska, 1990; Rockart and
Crescenzi,  1984;  Rockart  and De Long, 1988;  Rockart  and Treacy, 1982;  Watson et  al.,
1991). For example, one survey suggests that more than twenty percent of senior executives
have computers on their desks (Paller and Laska, 1990), although there are wide variations in
the estimates as to how many executives are direct users of computersfrom as low as one
percent of executives (Rae, 1986) to a figure of ten percent (Rockart and De Long, 1988). 
A number of arguments have been put forward to explain this increased use of computers at
executive level. For example, it  has been suggested that middle managers who have been
making direct use of computers in their daily work are being promoted to executive level
(Paller and Laska, 1990). This new breed of executives do not exhibit the fear of computer
technology that has characterised executive management up to now and are quite willing to
be direct users of computer technology. Also, executives have heretofore managed to remain
relatively untouched by the  computer,  seeing  it  as  a  tool  appropriate  to  others  of  lower
staturea  position  reinforced  by  some  influential  researchers  (Dearden,  1983;  Salerno,
1985).  However,  researchers  have  argued  that  there  may  be  feelings  of  guilt  among
executives, due to having missed "the wave of end user computing that has swept through the
rest of their organisations" (Harvey and Meiklejohn, 1989 p.124). 
Complementing this suggestion of executive demand for EIS, a number of ‘push’ factors
have  been  identified  as  motivating  the  development  of  EIS,  most  notably  the  highly
competitive nature of today's business environment which requires executives to act more
quickly and effectively if an organisation is to remain competitive (cf. Burkan, 1988; Friend,
1991; Fireworker and Zirkel, 1990; Rockart and De Long, 1988; Rockart and Treacy, 1982;
Watson et al., 1991; Wetherbe, 1991). Another ‘push’ factor is the fact that technology has
evolved to the stage where computer-based support for top management may be feasible (cf.
Paller and Laska, 1990; Rockart and De Long, 1988; Rockart and Treacy, 1982; Whymark,
1991).  These  technological  advances  have  seen  the  replacement  of  character-based  user
interfaces with "user-seductive" graphical interfaces that allow painless access to computer-
based information.
The literature also identifies a number of significant benefits which EIS could provide for
executives, including easing of information overload; improved efficiency in certain aspects
of their work; increased span of control; direct access to information rather than having to
rely  on  intermediaries;  and  improved  mental  models  of  the  business.  These  are  briefly
summarised here.
1.1 Easing Information Overload
Several  researchers have identified the information overload problem as  one of the most
serious  problems  confronting  top  management  today  (Kotter,  1982;  Mintzberg,  1975;
Naisbitt,  1982; Zuboff, 1988). The executive may be monitoring several  projects, and for
each one has to track a vast amount of information because it is not possible to predict where
problems are going to occur. This leads him to play safe and request all the information he
can get, but this bewildering choice and quantity of information may cause him to miss the
wheat  for  the  chaff  (Mintzberg,  1975).  Drucker  (1988)  suggests  that  many  highly-
computerised companies continue to operate under the simplistic belief that more data equals
more information. Thus, executive management, despite being already inundated with data,
exhibit an insatiable appetite for more.
Compounding  the  problem  of  the  executive's  need  to  monitor  such  a  vast  amount  of
information is the fact that so much of the information generated is of little benefit in helping
to run the organisation. Indeed, a US survey reports that 96 per cent of pages in management
reports are never read (Harvey & Meiklejohn, 1989). Also, Mintzberg (1975), in his seminal
empirical  study of the nature of executive work, concludes that  most  computer-generated
reports  are just  skimmed ritualistically, if  read at  all.  Researchers have estimated that  an
executive  may spend up to  half  his  time getting the  information  he  requires  (Wetherbe,
1991). However, it has been argued that EIS can help greatly by streamlining this process,
highlighting essential information and discarding the irrelevant. Problems of timeliness and
relevance which have plagued traditional reporting systems can be addressed (Harvey and
Meiklejohn, 1989).
1.2 Improved Efficiency
Much of  the work of executivestheir  use of  intuition  and the interpersonal  and verbal
aspects of their workcannot be well-supported by computer systems. However, while not
underplaying the importance of these aspects of executive work, researchers have made a
case for executive use of computer support in attainment of corporate goals. Isenberg (1984),
for example, suggests that if managers fully trusted their intuition, there wouldn't be any need
for rigorous and systematic analysis, but, in practice, they try to achieve a match between
"gut"  and  "head".  Rockart  and  De Long (1988)  use  Isenberg's  findings  to  support  their
argument that office support applications be included as part of EIS. Applications such as
calendaring facilities, diary facilities, electronic mail, for example, have the potential to make
the executive more efficient, rationalising the aspects of executive work that lend themselves
to  computer  support,  thus  freeing  up  the  executive  to  spend  more  time  on  complex
unstructured tasks, which is more properly the remit of the executive.
1.3 Increased Span of Control
Researchers have reported the need to increase the span of control in modern organisations.
Drucker,  for  example,  calls  for  "skimming  management's  midriff",  stating  that  middle
management is "overstaffed to the point of obesity". These extra layers of management cause
rigidity  and  inertia  whereas  flexibility  and  responsiveness  are  needed.  However,  the
electronic mail capability of EIS can contribute significantly to increasing the span of control,
allowing the executive to keep in close contact with subordinates.  Also,  EIS can help to
motivate and focus the organisation towards top management's goals and, because executives
are perceived to be more readily able to access this information through the use of EIS, it
extends  their  psychological  presence  throughout  the  organisation  (Rockart  and  De Long,
1988).
1.4 Direct Access to Information
Traditionally, executives have relied on intermediaries to perform the information gathering
function for them. However, this practice has a number of negative implications. Mintzberg
(1975) refers to what he terms the "dilemma of delegation". The executive is the best person
to  scan  the  information  since  he  has  all  the  intuition  locked in  his  brain,  but  he  has  to
leverage his scarce time and must delegate some information scanning responsibilities to his
subordinates who may have less well-developed business intuition. A similar argument has
also  been  made  by  El  Sawy (1985).  The  basic  problem  is  that  subordinates  filter  out
unnecessary information, but this is a subjective process as subordinates will shape the data
according to their ideals and interests. At best, this filtering causes the unintentional loss of
information that might be valuable if available to the executive. At worst,  executives are
presented with a sanitised version of the information,  as subordinates,  unwilling to allow
greater  visibility into  their  areas  of  responsibility,  suppress  important  information.  Thus,
there may be great advantages in the executive "dirtying his hands in the data" (Rockart and
Treacy,  1982),  playing  with  the  information  directly  and  perhaps  uncovering  valuable
business information. Other researchers have stressed the importance of this "playfulness" in
exploring possibilities (March, 1988), thus increasing the opportunity for the serendipitous
discovery of new and important information about the business.
1.5 Improved Mental Models
Rockart  and  De  Long define  a  mental  model  as  a  "cognitive  construct  that  describes  a
person's understanding of a particular segment of the managerial world" and state that the
enhancement of executive mental models is one of the areas in which EIS have the greatest
potential. They identify a number of ways in which EIS can improve an executive's mental
model, including improved access to external data; the ability to combine data from multiple
sources  and  present  it  in  more  meaningful  formats;  improved  analytic  and  modelling
capabilities  which  allow assumptions  to  be  surfaced  and  tested.  These  improved  mental
models may afford the executive fresh insights into how he conceptualises and understands
the business.
2. Research Study
The  factors  identified  in  the  previous  section  to  explain  the  emergence  of  EIS,  and  the
significant  benefits  that  these  systems  are  argued  as  providing  to  executives,  represent
plausible arguments in favour of EIS. However, given the fact that the nature of executive
work is not well-understood (Rockart and De Long, 1988; Zuboff, 1988), there is the distinct
possibility that  EIS represent  a  solution being proposed without  adequate  analysis of the
problem. In the past,  very little research in the EIS area has been of an empirical  nature
(Fitzgerald,  1991).  This  research study was thus  concerned with investigating the factors
behind the decision to implement  EIS, and the manner in  which EIS were being used in
practice in a number of organisations. A case study approach was adopted as this provides
richer detail than that possible through the use of a survey, for example. This has been argued
to be especially relevant in the case of EIS (McBride, 1997).
Four organisations were chosen for the study, drawn from the food processing, finance and
state sectors. All had developed some EIS systems with the average length of time since EIS
initiation just under two years. The organisations were chosen on the basis of being able to
get  sufficient  access  across  all  organisational  levels,  from  the  level  of  chief-
executive/managing director through all other levels and functional areas. While this criterion
for organisational selection may be seen as a weakness of the research methodology, it is
worth  noting  that  all  were  large  companiesannual  turnovers  ranging  from  £200m.  to
£700m., and numbers employed ranging from 600 to 4,000 employees. Also, it was felt that
interviewing  several  personnel  in  each  organisation  (average  of  5  interviewees  per
organisation)  was  important  in  that  it  was  leveraging  depth  and  ensured  that  several
perspectives  were  considered.  A total  of  21  people  were  interviewed,  with  interviewees
falling into the two broad categories of EIS developers and EIS users (executives and middle
management). While not wishing to adopt a rigid format for the interviews, questionnaires
were  used,  both  to  act  as  an  aide  memoire  and  to  give  some structure  to  the  interview
process, with separate questionnaires for the EIS users and EIS developers. 
3. Research Findings
The findings of the study in relation to the factors involved in the decision to implement EIS
are discussed in detail in Fitzgerald and Murphy (1994). Briefly, summarising here (see Table
1),  the  findings  do  not  support  the  conventional  literature  argument  that  EIS  are  being
introduced because  computer-literate  executives,  driven  by the  competitive  nature  of  the
prevailing  business  environment,  are  requesting  these  executive-friendly  computerised
information systems. Rather, the argument that fits better with the findings of this study could
be cast as follows: Technological advances have made available computerised systems which
overcome the traditional problems associated with the syntax-amnesic executive's reluctance
to use computers. In addition to this, the literature contains many evangelical examples of
companies who have successfully implemented EIS. This has caused an EIS envy (apologies
to  Freud)  phenomenon  whereby IS departments,  outside  the  strategic  epicentre  in  many
organisations, see EIS as a potential means of winning back influence at top management
level. A similar view of the multiple layers of factors influencing EIS development has been
reported by Nandhakumar (1996).
Table 1 Assessment of Relevancy of Factors in the Introduction of EIS
Number of Number of
Factor Interviewees Organisations
Availability of appropriate enabling technology 15 4
IS department push 10 3
Competitive nature of the business environment 4 2
Increased readiness of executives to use computers 1 1
However,  executives  are  also  supporting  EIS  development,  principally  because  they are
unsure of the role these systems might play, and fear competitors might make use of them
and achieve competitive advantage. However, such motives for introducing EIS do not augur
well for the committed use of EIS by executives. Indeed, the findings of this study show that
the majority (68 per cent) of users of EIS were at middle management level (see Table 2).
Some of the reasons for the low level of executive usage are discussed in detail below.
Table 2 Users of EIS by Organisational Level
Avg. per Total: All
Company Minimum Maximum Companies %age
Executive Management 5 2 10 18 32%
Middle Management 10 3 23 39 68%
3.1 Simplistic View of Executives and their Information Requirements
The principal instigators of the move to introduce EIS were the IS department in three of the
organisations studied (see Table 1). However, the IS department were not able to gain ready
access  to  executive  management.  Thus,  they  were  forced  to  collaborate  with  middle
management  on  EIS  developmenta  factor  which  had  implications  in  relation  to  the
information content of EIS. (This issue is discussed in a subsequent section). However, if EIS
are going to be used by executives, it is clearly reasonable to expect that they would be quite
involved in the process of identifying information requirementsthe rationale being that the
executive is  the best  person to determine the information content  of EIS as he  can thus
identify the content and format of the information he considers to be most important. This
helps ensure consistency and standardisation in the information presented, and it also sends
strong signals to other levels of the organisation as to what the executive considers to be
important. 
This  study  found  very  little  executive  involvement  in  the  identification  of  information
requirements for the systems being developed. In two organisations, EIS developers had used
largely their  own initiative  as  to  the  information  the  systems should  contain.  In another
organisation, the information content of the EIS was determined by replicating the existing
hard-copy reports received by executives. Only one organisation had carried out a formal
procedure (identification of critical success factors (CSFs) and key performance indicators
(KPIs) to determine executive information requirements (see Table 3).
Table 3 Identification of Executive Information Requirements
Number of
Method Organisations
EIS director used his own initiative 2
Replication of existing hard-copy reports 1
received by executives
Formal process based on critical success 1
factors and key performance indicators
Given  the  low level  of  actual  contact  between  executives  and  EIS  developers,  it  is  not
surprising that in some cases, EIS developers seemed to make the assumption that data and
information were synonymous, and a simplistic view of executive information requirements
was  taken,  with  EIS being viewed as  akin to  a  receptacle  into  which  information  could
simply be poured on the basis of the extent to which the information lent itself to capture,
rather  than  because  it  was  actually  requested  by  executives.  Strong  support  for  this
interpretation  comes  from  the  opinions  expressed  by  several  executives  as  to  the
unsatisfactory  information  content  of  their  EIS  systems.  For  example,  one  executive
suggested that his company’s EIS contained a “ragbag of information”. In another company,
an executive distinguished between “information that is nice to know, and information that
one needs to know”, suggesting that the information in his company’s EIS systems was of the
former type.
Even  though  IS personnel  tended  to  an  overly-simplistic  view of  executive  information
requirements, they, nevertheless, do have a role to play in EIS development. They have the
requisite technical skills and have the experience of mistakes made on system development
projects in the past. For example, this study found that EIS developers who did not have an IS
background had great expectations that EIS would eventually provide real-time 'drill-down'
into operational systems. However, the EIS developers with an IS background were well-
aware of the practical problems that could arise with such a strategy. 
3.2 EIS Viewed as Graphical MIS
Executives  spend their  careers trying to  construct  and maintain their  information system,
building up an extensive interpersonal network (Isenberg, 1984). However, as already stated,
EIS developers were typically of the view that executive information requirements are easily
understood and codified into a computer-based information system. EIS were thus viewed
more as MIS-type systems with a graphical interface, rather than a new and distinct category
of   information  systems  in  their  own  right.  To  this  end,  the  systems as  they had  been
implemented were providing rapid access to pre-defined categories of information which was
generally  concerned  with  historical  financial  performance.  EIS  systems  were  thus  very
tightly-coupled to existing MIS systemsa strategy which is not well-suited to the needs of
executives (El Sawy, 1985). Furthermore, Turban and Schaeffer (1989) have suggested that
EIS are quite different to MIS, and as such, little will  be transferable from existing MIS
systems.  Indeed,  a  different  development  methodology  is  recommended  (Volonino  and
Watson, 1990). Notwithstanding this, in two of the organisations, EIS developers stated that
the same approach to developing MIS should also be applied when developing EIS.
3.3 Information Content of EIS
Researchers have argued that the use of EIS as a control mechanism is a sub-optimal one, in
that EIS should play a role in strategic planning (Friend, 1989; Rockart & De Long, 1988).
Similarly,  researchers  have  emphasised  that  the  information  focus  of  EIS should  not  be
primarily on financial  figures  but  on more market-oriented soft  and external  information
(Bentley, 1989; Rockart & De Long, 1988; Shoebridge, 1988; Volonino & Watson, 1990;
Watson et al., 1991). 
However,  this  study found  that  all  organisations  were  using  EIS  primarily  as  a  control
mechanism. In fact, this was seen as the most useful role for EIS (see Table 4). This strong
emphasis on control is probably to a large extent a reflection of the fact that the primary users
of EIS were middle managers rather than executives, operational control being the primary
responsibility  of  the  former.  Also,  the  information  content  of  EIS  was  predominantly
financial, with little in the way of external or soft informationsimple daily stock market
share  prices  were  typically the  extent  to  which  external  information  was  provided.  The
perception of EIS as a control mechanism may also be due in part to this focus on financially-
oriented  historical  information.  There are  negative  aspects,  however,  to  concentrating on
financial performance figures in that it may be too narrow a focus for overall organisational
success, which is the primary concern of executives. By concentrating on historical financial
performance, EIS may be criticised for fulfilling the sub-optimal role of ‘coming in after the
battle is over and counting the wounded’, rather than playing a more useful role in providing
information to support the strategic direction set for the organisation. If EIS could provide
such information support, the take-up by executives would be much greater.
Table 4 Rating of EIS as a control mechanism
Average Lowest Highest
Interview Question Value Value Cited Value Cited
"The most useful role for EIS 
is that of control mechanism" 4.7 4 5
1. Strongly disagree.    5. Strongly agree
4. Reasons Behind Executive Support for EIS: The Hidden Agenda
Although executives were not leading the push to develop EIS, and did not rate EIS as having
any major benefits for themselves (see Table 5), there was some support for EIS from several
executives. However, the motives underpinning this support are quite interesting, in that they
were primarily of a political nature, rather than because EIS were perceived as having any
direct benefit to executives. 
Table 5 Executive rating of EIS in terms of benefits provided
Average Lowest Highest
Dimension Value Value Cited Value Cited
Benefits Provided 3.2 1 4
1. Little Benefit.    5. Major Benefit
4.1 EIS Anxiety: A Defensive Strategy
The EIS envy term was introduced above to explain why the IS department were so much in
favour  of  the  high  profile  nature  of  EIS  development.  However,  a  similar  phenomenon
occurred  at  the  executive  level  where  it  manifested  itself  in  terms  of  EIS  anxiety.  For
example,  several  senior  executives,  very  much  aware  of  the  current  interest  in  using
information technology for achieving competitive advantage, expressed their concerns that
their competitors might make use of EIS to gain competitive advantage, and they feared they
could be at a disadvantage by not having some EIS development underway. These executives,
while  conceding  that  they  would  not  become  users  of  EIS,  were  nevertheless  strongly
supportive of EIS development  in  their  organisations.  This  finding is consistent  with the
argument stated earlier, namely that executives may be supporting EIS due to feelings of guilt
at having missed out on the end-user computing phenomenon in the past.
For other, less-senior, executives, internal organisational politics was very definitely a factor
in their decision to become involved in EIS. These executives sought access to EIS through
fear that they might be marginalised if other executives had access and they didn't. However,
because it was seen as a hedging exercise, they were not prepared to commit more than the
minimum necessary involvementenough to ensure that if EIS became a vital component in
the executive armoury, they would be sufficiently informed to stay in touch. A 'Catch-22'
scenario emerges in that executive time is very precious, and they are not likely to expend it
on EIS development, unless they believe such a system could truly benefit them. However, if
they do not commit the time, any systems developed will have serious shortcomings.
4.2 Business Process Redesign
While  70  percent  of  executives  interviewed  did  not  perceive  EIS  as  being  useful  in
supporting their  work,  in one organisation,  top management were very supportive of EIS
development.  This  organisation  had  appointed  senior  executives  to  the  executive  and
operating sponsor roles (the only organisation in the study to formally do so). However, it
emerged that executives in this organisation had a hidden agenda, seeing EIS in terms of the
opportunity  it  represented  for  facilitating  business  process  redesign.  The  organisation  in
question had recently undergone privatisation and were actively involved in reengineering
business  processes.  Several  researchers  have  identified  the  thorough  examination  and
understanding of existing business processes as an important preliminary stage in business
process redesign (Bevilacqua and Thornhill, 1992; Davenport and Short, 1990; Kitch, 1992;
Nedzel,  1992).  However,  the  organisation  in  question  had  been  experiencing  major
difficulties in getting managers to commit time to examining existing business processes and
management practices. Senior executives saw EIS as a possible means by which management
attention  could  be  focused  on  these  issues.  Thus,  they  were  using  EIS  development  to
facilitate this, and saw the fundamental examination of business processes that was motivated
by EIS development as a major benefit. 
Executives in  this  organisation,  including the executive and operating sponsors,  were not
overly-concerned as to whether any EIS systems would emerge and survive as operational
systems.  For  these  executives,  the eventual  emergence of operational  EIS systems was a
bonus, in that  the process of critically examining management processes was rated as far
more valuable. To most advocates, this role of EIS as a means to a business process redesign
end may seem to be akin to the tail wagging the dog. Ironically, one of the objectives of EIS
is  the  institutionalisation  of  the  corporate  knowledge-basea  goal  common  to  business
process redesign as well (Kitch, 1992). 
Ironically, the EIS systems that eventually emerged in this organisation were rated higher by
executives in this organisation than in any other. Also, this organisation had many more EIS
users, notably at executive level, than any other. This is perhaps indicative of the fact that,
rather than the EIS director using his own initiative as to the information the EIS should
contain, the information content of their EIS had a sound underpinning in actual management
processes.  EIS developers  attended  formal  board  meetings  and  other  executive  planning
sessions. They also used EIS itself to track the manner in which executives were actually
using  the  system.  Thus,  the  developers  gained  a  very good  insight  into  executive  work
practices,  and  were  able  to  incorporate  this  into  their  EIS  systems.  Researchers  have
suggested  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  process  used  to  introduce  technology  strongly
influences its ultimate impact (Rockart and Short, 1988). Certainly, in this organisation, the
process followed led to better likelihood of defining the right problem, and thus, developers
had a better chance of providing the right solution.
5. Conclusion
Executives rely primarily on trusted support staff to provide them with the information they
need to run their business, and the findings of this study indicate that this is not going to
change. Nevertheless, the notion that EIS are not of any benefit to an organisation if they do
not  become  operational  or  if  they are  not  used  by executives  is  open  to  question.  EIS
development may have fulfilled a purpose by facilitating organisational change, such as in the
case of business process redesign reported in this study. Thus, EIS development is  much
more  an  organisational  initiative  than  a  technological  initiative,  and  as  Paller  and Laska
(1990) suggested, the journey may be more important than the destination. 
However,  in  most  organisations  where  EIS  are  introduced,  it  is  presumably  with  the
intention, initially at any rate, that they be used by executives. While it was too early to say
how all the systems that had been developed in these organisations would eventually fare, the
evidence to date suggests that many of the systems have failed to elicit even an initial stage of
euphoria  among  executive  ranks,  and  were  not  likely  to  be  used  by  executives  in  any
meaningful  day-to-day situation.  Certainly,  the  lack  of  real  executive  involvement  might
indicate impending failure in some organisations. The paradox emerges that executives won't
use EIS until  it  becomes part  of the management process, and this  will  not happen until
executives commit adequate time to the process of developing EIS. The introduction of EIS
should  represent  a  deliberate  business-driven  intervention  rather  than  accidental  or
serendipitous change. Yet, for many of the executives in this study, it represented a project
that might reap some dividend, but it was not being allowed to consume much of their time
or attention.
A corollary of this  is  that  executives were not  willing to  participate  meaningfully in  the
identification of information content  of EIS. In the ensuing vacuum,  developers took the
initiative as to what should information should be provided. However, as already stated, there
was a tendency towards over-inclusion, as information was gathered which lent itself to ready
capture. In fact, such a simplistic approach to the determination of the information content of
EIS may do more harm than good by diluting the perceptions of executives as to what the EIS
concept represents in terms of the commitment required to achieve results. 
In short, if EIS are to be used by executives, then the latter must take a much more proactive
role in the development of these systems, rather than allowing the IS department to develop
EIS in isolation. The result of the latter all-too-common scenario is that the IS department
will consult with middle management with whom they can gain worthwhile access, or will
focus on financial control information as most IS departments report through the financial
controller function. Both of these options lead to rather sterile, historical performance type
information being provided.
EIS development thus demands substantial and proactive executive commitment if it  is to
have any chance of success. There is no royal road to EIS, and relying on computer packages
alone  is  not  enoughthey  cannot  produce  the  desired  effect  if  not  firmly  founded  on
executive processes in the first place. As Bentley (1989) rather pessimistically concludes:
The real-world  executive  information  system is  a  complex,  many-levelled  one  with  both
formal and informal information inputs. It also includes all the executive’s experience and
training and personal knowledge. To suggest this can all be placed onto a computer system
is, to say the least, ill-informed.
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